Tunisia: How the US Got it Wrong

Author: Mark LeVine

Publisher: Al Jazeera

Date Published: 16 January 2011

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Article Summary

In the article linked above, Mark Levine argues that the Obama Administration, by failing to take a firm position and respond decisively as the Tunisian Revolution occurred, missed the opportunity to use the Tunisian Revolution to begin the process of building a new political order of liberal democracy throughout the Middle East. In doing so, LeVine frames the issues of the Tunisian Revolution, particularly issues of stability versus democracy, in terms of the West’s strategic and moral interests in the Middle East. LeVine (2011) argues that the Obama Administration’s policy of remaining on the sidelines of the Tunisian Revolution is a continuation of the West’s policy of giving support to stable and cooperative autocratic regimes over potentially unstable or uncooperative democratic regimes throughout the Middle East (Decades of Support Despite Suppression section, para. 2). This policy has been recognized by the United States as having detrimental effects, yet continues to be pursued (LeVine, 2011, Obama’s Reagan Moment section, para. 2). The Tunisian Revolution is a rejection of this policy by the Middle East and presents an opportunity for a fundamental restructuring of the Middle Eastern political order (LeVine, A Region’s Tipping Point section, para. 1). With the Tunisian Revolution, the United States’ traditional policy of supporting friendly autocratic regimes is no longer tenable in the Middle East (LeVine, 2011, Sinking in the Sand section, para. 1). LeVine (2011) calls upon the United States to put its full support behind the Tunisian Revolution by freezing the assets of Tunisia’s former elites, by refusing to recognize any governments in Tunisia which are not democratically elected, and by making it clear to the Tunisian people that the United States would support them in their effort to overthrow the repressive regime of Ben Ali (Crucial Next Steps section, para. 2). The United States similarly must use the Tunisian Revolution as an example to other regimes throughout the Middle East and demonstrate to them that they must adapt to a liberal democratic order or face isolation orchestrated by the American government. LeVine states that “the President should call on every country in the region to move towards free, fair, and internationally monitored elections within a specified time or risk facing a similar cut-off of ties, aid and cooperation” (LeVine, 2011, Crucial Next Steps section, para. 4). By fully supporting democratic reforms in the Middle East and firmly rejecting autocrats in the region, the United States could lead the Middle East into an age of liberal democracy which would discourage extremism and ensure America’s continued influence in the region (Crucial Next Steps section, para. 7).

Based on the arguments he makes in the article, LeVine appears to value liberal democracy, self-determination, United States leadership, and diplomatic efforts at maintaining national security. LeVine criticizes Obama and Clinton for rolling back American leadership and the long-term US policy of supporting autocratic regimes in the name of stability. LeVine’s calls for a revised policy towards the Middle East reflect his assertion that United States policy is “sinking into the sands” (Sinking in the Sand section, para. 1).  LeVine values diplomacy and the exercise of soft power over the use of military force to coerce other nations to follow US policy, as evidenced by his statement that taking a firm position in support of the Tunisian Revolution would allow Obama to do “more to defeat the forces of extremism than a million soldiers in AfPak and even more drone strikes could ever hope to accomplish.” (LeVine, 2011, A Region’s Tipping Point section, para. 4). In order to maintain United States leadership in the Middle East and bolster United States security, the United States must adapt to the birth of a democratic order which represents Tunisian interests, rather than the interests of the West or other powers (LeVine, 2011, The Birth of a Human Nationalism? section, para. 4). The development of nationalism and rejection of governments which support the interests of foreign powers over the interests of Tunisia are positive developments when self-determination is valued.

Guiding Questions

What should have been or should be the role of the West in the Tunisian Revolution and its aftermath?

When stability and security run up against liberal democracy, which should prevail or be supported?